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1 “SLAPP” in the statutory context is an acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation.   In passing RCW 4.24.525, the legislature expressed a concern over lawsuits “brought
primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the
redress of grievances.”  RCW 4.24.525, Notes, 2010 c 118.   The statute provides for the rapid
resolution of a special motion, filed by the defendant, to strike the SLAPP. 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
LARRY JOE DAVIS, JR., an individual,          
Plaintiff,        
v.
AVVO, INC., a Washington corporation, d/b/a
Avvo.com,                
Defendants.           
CASE NO. C11-1571RSM 
ORDER ON SPECIAL MOTION TO             
STRIKE, PURSUANT TO RCW 4.24.535
   
This matter is before the Court for consideration of a special motion to strike filed by defendant
Avvo, Inc. (“Avvo”).  Dkt. # 47.  This motion is brought pursuant to Washington’s “anti-SLAPP” law,
RCW 4.24.525.1  Plaintiff has opposed the motion.  After careful consideration of the record and the
parties’ memoranda, the Court has determined for the reasons set forth herein that the motion shall be
granted.  
BACKGROUND
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2 http://www.floridabar.org/divcom/pi/certsect.nsf/certifications, accessed on March 22, 2012.  
3 http://www.avvo.com/find-a-lawyer?ref=homepage accessed on March 22, 2012.
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Plaintiff Larry Joe Davis, Jr., is a Florida attorney, board-certified in Health Law.   According to
the website of the Florida State Bar Association, board certification is a program by which licensed
attorneys may become recognized for special knowledge, skill and proficiency in a designated area of
practice.2  The certification process involves earning a passing grade on an examination, peer review
assessment, and satisfaction of the certification area’s continuing legal education requirements.  A
Florida attorney who is board certified may use the designation “Board Certified,” “Expert,” or
“Specialist.”  Id.  
Defendant Avvo operates a website that provides profiles of many lawyers, doctors, and dentists
in the U.S., including area of practice or specialty, disciplinary history, experience, peer endorsements,
and client or patient reviews.   The lawyer section of the website is searchable by area of practice and
location.3  The information is gathered from publicly available material, including state bar associations,
state courts, and lawyers’ and firms’ websites.  Declaration of Joshua King, Dkt. # 9, Exhibit 16.  The
profile contains an Avvo numerical rating (zero to ten), calculated mathematically from information in
the lawyer’s profile, including years in practice, disciplinary actions, professional achievements, and
industry recognition.  Id., Exhibit 25.  The rating is intended to guide the public in finding a suitable
qualified lawyer.  Id., Exhibit 3.  An attorney cannot change his rating by request to Avvo, but he or she
may register on the Avvo website, “claim” his or her profile, and update information regarding work
experience,  practice areas, and professional achievements, any of which may change the rating.  Id. 
Clients may submit reviews, which may also change the rating.  
Plaintiff filed this action for libel and violation of two Florida statutes in Florida state court on
August 26, 2010.  Dkt. # 2.   He asserted in that complaint that he first learned of his Avvo profile and
rating on August 19, 2010, when a prospective client called him to ask for help with an employment
issue involving a hostile environment claim.  Complaint, Dkt. # 2, ¶ 9.  She told plaintiff she called him
because he was the “lowest rated employment lawyer” and she assumed he would be “desperate for
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4 http://www.avvo.com/attorneys/33701-fl-larry-davis-1295960.html accessed on March 22,
2012.  
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employment.”  Id., ¶ 11.
              Plaintiff informed the caller that he was not a “low-ranking employment lawyer” but rather a
Board Certified health law attorney, and declined to represent her.  Id., ¶ 12.   After concluding the
telephone call, plaintiff visited the Avvo.com website and saw that his practice area was depicted by a
“pie chart” which stated “100%  employment/labor law.”  He then went to log on to his profile page and
“attempt to correct the misinformation, which included an incorrect business address and blatantly
incorrect practice area.”  Id., ¶ 14.  He alleges that after “participating in the Avvo.com website,” he saw
his rating go from 4.3 to 5.0.  Id., ¶ 15.  Then, over the next several days, he attempted to “delist”
himself from the website entirely, but was unable to do so.  Id., ¶ 16.  As a result of his efforts,
according to plaintiff, his rating dropped to 3.7, accompanied by a “caution” in red letters.  Id.  Plaintiff
has provided “screen shots” of other attorneys’ profiles, but none of his own to demonstrate these
changes.  Declaration of Larry Joe Davis, Jr., Dkt. # 20, Exhibits 1, 2, 3.  The Court notes that at this
time,  plaintiff’s profile page displays no photograph, and shows a rating of 4.4, a “concern” in red
letters, together with the statement, also in red, that “this lawyer has been disciplined by a state licensing
authority,” together with a link to more information regarding the disciplinary action.4  Plaintiff’s area of
practice is still listed on his profile as “100%  employment/labor” despite the fact that he has the power
to change that entry.  There are two very positive five-star client reviews.  
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint shortly after filing the original, and served a copy on
defendant on September 14, 2010.  Dkt. # 3.  The amended complaint changed the date that plaintiff
learned of his Avvo profile and low rating to August 17, 2010,  deleted the causes of action for libel, and
added a claim of invasion of privacy/false light.  Dkt. # 3.  The action was removed to the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida on October 19, 2010, on the basis of the parties’
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5 Although the amended complaint did not plead a sum certain as damages, defendant met the
burden on removal of establishing that the jurisdictional amount of $75,000 has been met by pointing to
a settlement demand for $145,000 (with an apology) or $175,000 (without an apology) presented by
plaintiff after he filed suit.  Notice of Removal, Dkt. # 1.  A defendant may use the amount demanded by
the plaintiff as settlement as evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional
minimum.  Conn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F. 3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002).   Plaintiff’s demand was not
clearly excessive in light of the fact that his amended complaint includes requests for actual damages,
punitive and exemplary damages, and statutory attorneys fees on four separate claims.  Dkt. # 3.  
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diversity.5  Dkt. # 1.   
After defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Proc.
12(b)(6), plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint.  Dkt. ## 8, 12.  The Second Amended Complaint
was stricken by the court for failure to obtain leave of court before filing, as required by Fed.R.Civ.P.
15(a)(2).  Dkt. # 14.  Defendant then moved pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer the action to this
district pursuant to a forum selection clause on the Avvo.com website, and other factors.   Dkt. # 15. 
Before the court ruled on the motion to transfer, plaintiff sought leave to amend his complaint a third
time.  Dkt. # 21.  The motion was granted, and plaintiff filed his Third Amended Complaint on April 25,
2011.  Dkt. # 26.  The Third Amended Complaint, which is now the operative complaint in this case,
asserts three causes of action under Florida law regarding the alleged misrepresentation of plaintiff’s
address and practice area, and the use of his photograph in his profile.  He does not challenge his rating
or the mention of disciplinary action.  
After the Third Amended Complaint was filed, defendant filed, in rapid succession, a motion to
strike designated paragraphs of the Third Amended Complaint (Dkt. # 30), a motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and/or failure to state a claim (Dkt. # 31), and a renewed motion to transfer
venue to the Western District of Washington (Dkt. # 32).  The motion to transfer was granted and the
case was transferred to this Court on September 29, 2011.  Dkt. ## 43, 44.  The Florida district court
specifically found that plaintiff, a licensed and board-certified attorney, agreed to the Terms of Use on
the Avvo.com website, including the forum selection clause, when he registered and logged in to update
his profile.  Order, Dkt. # 43, p. 7.  
After transfer, defendant did not renew the previously-filed motion to strike and motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in this Court.  Instead, on November 2, 2011, defendant
Case 2:11-cv-01571-RSM   Document 55    Filed 03/28/12   Page 4 of 13
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28  ORDER - 5
filed the motion to strike the complaint pursuant to RCW 4.24.525 that is currently before the Court for
consideration.   This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).  
DISCUSSION
I.  Legal Standard
The Washington anti-SLAPP Act is intended to address lawsuits brought primarily to chill the
valid exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and petition for redress.  The legislature found
that it is in the public interest for citizens to participate in matters of public concern, and to provide
information on public issues that affect them without fear of reprisal through abuse of the judicial
process.  RCW 4.24.525; Senate Bill 6395, Laws of 2010, Ch. 118, § 1.  
The law provides, in relevant part, that “[a] party may bring a special motion to strike any claim
that is based on an action involving public participation” as defined in the statute.  RCW 4.24.525(4)(a). 
The section applies to “any claim, however characterized, that is based on an action involving public
participation and petition.”  RCW 4.24.525(2).  An action involving public participation includes “[a]ny
oral statement made . . . in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of
public concern” and “other lawful conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of
free speech in connection with an issue of public concern. . .”  RCW 4.24.525(2) (d) and (e).    
An anti-SLAPP law provides relief to a defendant which is in the nature of immunity from suit.   
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F. 3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 2003) (addressing California’s anti-SLAPP statute.)    In
passing the law, the Washington legislature noted concern regarding both the chilling effect on the valid
exercise of the constitutional right of freedom of speech, and the chilling effect of “the costs associated
with defending such suits.”  RCW 4.24.525, notes 2010 Ch. 118.  The statute accordingly provides for
an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, plus a statutory award of $10,000, to a defendant who prevails on
an anti-SLAPP motion.  RCW 4.24.525(6)(a)(i), (ii).   Conversely, if the Court finds that the anti-
SLAPP motion to strike was frivolous or brought solely to cause unnecessary delay, costs, attorneys’
fees, and $10,000 shall be awarded to the opposing party.  RCW 4.24.525.(6)(b)(i), (ii).  The special
motion to strike is therefore not without risk to the moving party.
To prevail on the special motion to strike, the defendant bears the initial burden of showing, by a
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preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff’s claim is based on an action involving public
participation or petition.  If this burden is met, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, a probability of prevailing on the claim.  If the plaintiff meets this burden, the
motion to strike will be denied.  RCW 4.24.525.(4)(b).
II.  Analysis  
The Court has no difficulty finding that the Avvo.com website is “an action involving public
participation,” in that it provides information to the general public which may be helpful to them in
choosing a doctor, dentist, or lawyer.  Further, members of the general public may participate in the
forum by providing reviews of an individual doctor or lawyer on his or her profile page.  The profile
pages on the Avvo.com website constitute a “vehicle for discussion of public issues . . .  distributed to a
large and interested community.”  New York Studio, Inc. v. Better Business Bureau of Alaska, Oregon,
and Western Washington, 2011 WL 2414452 at *4 (W.D.Wash. June 13, 2011).    Therefore the burden
shifts to plaintiff to show, by clear and convincing evidence, a probability of prevailing on his Florida
state law claims.  
Before turning to plaintiff’s claims, the Court must consider his assertion that this motion is
untimely.  He contends that since the Third Amended Complaint was filed and served on April 25, 2011,
the deadline to file this motion was June 26, 2011, pursuant to RCW 4.24.525(5)(a).  The cited section
states, in relevant part, “The special motion to strike may be filed within sixty days of the service of the
most recent complaint, or, in the court’s discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper.” 
RCW4.24.525(5)(a).  The use of the term “may” instead of the mandatory “shall” means that this is not
a firm deadline to be applied in all cases.  In light of the fact that the action was not transferred to this
Court until September 20, 2011, the Court finds that the November 2, 2011 filing is timely.  
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint asserts three causes of action under Florida law: (1) false
advertising, in violation of Fla. Stat. § Section 817.41;  (2) unauthorized use of a likeness for a
commercial purpose, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 540.08;  and (3) violation of the Florida Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.204  (“FDUTPA”).  Third Amended Complaint, Dkt. # 26,
pp. 10-12.   Defendant asserts, in the first instance, that Washington law, not Florida law, applies to all
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of plaintiff’s claims, because he specifically agreed to that under the Terms of Use when he registered
on the Avvo.com website.  
The Terms of Use agreement states, in relevant part, that
These Site Terms and your use of the Site shall be governed by and construed in accordance 
with the law of the State of Washington applicable to agreements made and to be entirely
performed within the State of Washington (even if your use is outside the State of 
Washington), without resort to its conflict of law provisions.  You agree that with respect 
to any disputes or claims  . . .  any action at law or in equity arising out of or relating to the 
Site or these Site Terms shall be filed only in the state and federal courts located in King 
County, Washington. . . .
Declaration of Joshua King, Dkt. # 16, ¶¶ 3-9, Exhibit 1.   As noted above, the district court in Florida
held that plaintiff is bound by the Terms of Use when it enforced the forum selection clause.   The court
also addressed the enforceability of the choice of law provision, noting that 
Washington and Florida courts review the enforceability of choice of law provisions under 
a standard similar to that set forth in Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
of Laws (i.e., whether a choice of law clause would violate the public policy of the state 
with the materially greater interest). 
 Order of Transfer, Dkt. # 46, p. 8 (citing In re DirecTV Early Cancellation Litigation, 738 F. Supp. 2d
1062, 1088-90 (C.D.Ca. 2010)).   The court found that the Washington Consumer Protection Act, RCW
19.86.020 (WCPA), and the FDUTPA are “substantially similar,” and that even if this Court were to
apply the WCPA to plaintiff’s claims, and “assuming that the WCPA is more restrictive than the
FDUCPA,” the enforcement of the forum selection clause would not deprive plaintiff of his day in court. 
Id.  
This Court applies the choice-of-law principles of the transferor court.  Shannon-Vail Five, Inc.,
v. Bunch, 270 F. 3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 2001).   Florida law holds that contractual choice of law
provisions are presumptively valid.  Gaisser v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 593 F. Supp. 2d
1297, 1300 (S.D.Fla. 2009).   “Florida enforces choice-of-law provisions unless the law of the chosen
forum contravenes strong public policy.”  Mazzoni Farms, Inc., v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 761
So. 2d 306, 311 (Fla. 2000).   Nowhere does plaintiff argue that analysis of his claims under
Washington law would contravene strong public policy.  He simply contends that “section 501.211 [of
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a violation of this part.”  Fla.Stat. § 501.211(1).    
7 The court compared Fla.Stat. § 501.204(1), which prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition,
unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce” with RCW 19.86, which prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”  Order of Transfer, Dkt. # 43, p. 8.   
8 Treating plaintiff’s claims under the WCPA instead of the FDUTPA is not prejudicial to
plaintiff in terms of the ruling on this motion to strike.  The private right of action under the FDUTPA is
tempered by a provision requiring the plaintiff to post a bond to indemnify the defendant for damages,
including attorney’s fees, in the event the action is found to be frivolous, lacking in legal or factual
merit, or brought for the purpose of harassment.  Fla.Stat. 501.211(3).  
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the Florida Statues] is not waivable by any [Terms of Use].”  Plaintiff’s Response, Dkt. # 6.6  That
assertion is not responsive to the choice of law question.  Further, the Florida district court’s
determination that the WCPA and FDUTPA are substantially similar,7  and that application of
Washington law would not be unfair to plaintiff, constitutes a finding that such application would not
contravene strong public policy.  This Court therefore finds that the choice-of-law clause is enforceable,
and that the WCPA, not the FDUTPA shall apply to plaintiff’s claims.8  
The WCPA's citizen suit provision states that “[a]ny person who is injured in his or her business
or property” by a violation of the act may bring a civil suit for injunctive relief, damages, attorney fees
and costs, and treble damages.  RCW 19.86.090.  To prevail on a private WCPA claim, plaintiff must
prove (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) occurring in trade or commerce, (3) affecting the
public interest, (4) injury to the plaintiff’s business or property, and (5) causation.  Panag v. Farmers
Insurance Co. of Washington , 166 Wash. 2d 27, 37 (2009) (citing Hangman Ridge Stables, Inc., v.
Safeco Title Insurance Co., 105 Wn. 2d 778, 784 (1986).   The causation element may be met by
demonstrating that the deceptive acts “induced the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting,” and the
plaintiff’s damages were “brought about by such action or failure to act.”  Fidelity Mortgage Co. v.
Seattle Times Co., 131 Wash. App. 462, 468-69 (2005).  
In the Third Amended Complaint, plaintiff identifies the deceptive acts or practices as the
misrepresentation of his practice area, together with the misappropriation of his image and placement on
his profile page.  He claims that his listing on the website was “deceptive to the public, to consumers, to
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other lawyers, and specifically to the potential client referenced herein.”  Third Amended Complaint,
Dkt. # 26, ¶ 43.  He asserts that this misrepresentation of his practice area is an attempt by Avvo.com to
“coerce lawyers by illegal and tortious conduct, on an epidemic scale, to correct mislistings” and is “an
actionable trade practice.”  Id., ¶ 41.   
As noted by the Florida district court, both the WCPA and the FDUTPA require that the
deceptive act occur in trade or commerce.  This Court has previously held that Avvo.com does not
engage in “trade” or “commerce.”  John Henry Browne v. Avvo, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1254
(W.D.Wash. 2007).  
“Trade” and “commerce” are defined as “the sale of assets or services.  .  . .   Avvo collects 
data from public sources, attorneys, and references, rates attorneys (where appropriate), and
provides both the underlying data and the ratings to consumers free of charge.  No assets or
services are sold to people who visit the site in the hopes of finding a lawyer and no charge 
is levied against attorneys or references who choose to provide information.  It is hard to 
imagine how an information clearinghouse and/or ratings service could be considered
“commerce”. . . .  Instead, plaintiffs argue that Avvo’s offer to sell advertising space to 
attorneys transforms all of defendants’ activities into trade or commerce.  The advertising
program is separate and distinct from the attorney profiles that are the subject of plaintiffs’
complaint.
Id.   The Court ruled that “Avvo’s publication of information and ratings based on available data is not
‘trade or commerce’ and cannot form the basis of a CPA claim.”  Id.  
Plaintiff seeks to distance his claim from this result by asserting that “[i]n the Browne opinion,
this Court stated at 1254 that the placement of paid advertising in a free listing of brokerage rates would
make such list commercial speech.”  Plaintiff’s Response, Dkt. # 50, p. 8 (citing Fidelity Mortgage
Corp. v. Seattle times Co., 131 Wash. App. at 470.   This statement mischaracterizes the ruling in
Browne.   Referring to Fidelity Mortgage, the Court stated that “the court found that a newspaper’s
publication of mortgage rates from various lenders was not, in the absence of payment from the lenders,
trade or commerce.  On the other hand, the same rate chart could be considered trade or commerce if the
newspaper accepted an advertising fee in exchange for including a lender in the chart.”  Browne, 525 F.
Supp. 2d at 1254.   The Court thus distinguished a hypothetical situation where a newspaper accepted a
fee for “including a lender in the chart” from the Avvo.com website where the free attorney profiles and
the advertising images on the right side of the webpage are “separate and distinct.”  
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mistake is simply the result of careless programming.  “Avvo.com’s computer program was not
designed properly, and in a rush to list and rate ‘90% of lawyers in the United States’ allowed the
program to run rampant making reckless mistakes, as was the case here and with the other Board
Certified lawyers mentioned herein.”  Third Amended Complaint, Dkt. # 26, ¶ 38.  
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Plaintiff thus cannot assert a claim under the WCPA for the alleged misrepresentation of his
practice area or the use of his image, as these are part of his profile which under Browne is not “trade or
commerce.”  However, in his response to the motion to strike, he clarifies that his claim concerns a
different “deceptive act or practice” that he contends is related to Avvo’s business model.  This
argument arises from his allegation in the Third Amended Complaint at ¶ 41, noted above, that the
misrepresentation of his practice area is an intentional act by Avvo to induce him to register on the
website to correct the misrepresentation.9  “This profile-based content-based ad space is on information
and belief, one of two primary revenue generators for Defendants, the other being the Avvo Pro
membership (to stop the targeted ads, of course.)” Plaintiff’s Response, Dkt. # 50, p. 9.  Plaintiff thus 
contends that lawyers are induced to apply for “Pro” membership to prevent competitor’s ads from
appearing on their profile pages.  He states, “That is, in fact, apparently one of the primary selling points
of the Avvo Pro membership.”  Id., 8.  The Court accepts this as plaintiff’s statement of the deceptive
act or practice which forms the basis of his WCPA claim.  
Plaintiff has presented no evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, to demonstrate that
there is any probablily of prevailing on his WCPA claim.  He points to no evidence in the record to
support the conclusory allegations regarding Avvo’s advertisements.  Indeed, he has provided no
evidence at all; he has merely “verified” the allegations set forth in his Third Amended Complaint. 
Affidavit of Larry Joe Davis, Dkt. # 51.  A complaint is not evidence. Plaintiff has submitted no separate
declaration of facts within his personal knowledge which support his claims, as contemplated under
RCW 4.24.525(4)(c) (In determining whether a party has established by clear and convincing evidence a
probability of prevailing on a claim, “the court shall consider the pleadings and supporting and opposing
affidavits stating the facts.”)   Instead of presenting an affidavit, plaintiff asserts in his response that “[i]f
one were to search on Avvo for a particular well-known lawyer, such as a well-known Board Certified
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Health Lawyer, when one is directed to that lawyer’s page, one would likely see an advertisement for a
competing lawyer, as Plaintiff did in August 2010, which competing lawyer has paid Avvo to have that
ad placed on the listed lawyer’s page.”  Plaintiff’s Response, Dkt. # 50, p. 9.  These speculations as to
what “one would likely see,” are not evidence.  Nor has plaintiff alleged how this allegedly deceptive
act of Avvo induced him to act or refrain from acting in some manner, so as to establish causation for
his loss.   Fidelity Mortgage Co., 131 Wash. App. at 468.  Finally, he has not alleged any actual
damages caused by the deceptive act.
In his complaint, plaintiff pleads in general terms that “Defendant’s actions have damaged
Plaintiff individually, as well as many other lawyers in Florida, and Defendant’s actions have misled
consumers in Florida.”  Third Amended Complaint, Dkt. # 26, ¶ 51.  He requests “actual damages” in
addition to declaratory and injunctive relief, but nowhere in the complaint does he state what monetary
loss he actually suffered.  While plaintiff purports to represent the interests of other Florida attorneys
and the general public in this matter, he may only request monetary damages for his own losses.   
In his response to the motion to strike, he clarifies that he was “directly damaged by the time
wasted on the phone with a potential client that had been misled by the Avvo.com site.”   Plaintiff’s
Response, Dkt. # 50, p. 11.   He estimates his loss at one-half hour of his time, which he bills at $350 an
hour, for a total of $175.   He asserts there were other calls, so his damages are “not de minimus or
speculative, especially on a massive scale.”  Id.  The problem, however, is not that his loss is de
minimus, but that it does not flow from the alleged deceptive act.  According to the allegations of the
complaint, the prospective client called him, and wasted his time, solely because of his profile; she
erroneously thought he was a “low-ranking” attorney who practiced “100% employment law.”  Third
Amended Complaint, Dkt. # 26, ¶ 22.  Under Browne, information on the profile page cannot serve as
the basis for a WCPA claim.  Plaintiff is fully aware of this, as he seeks to distinguish his consumer
fraud claim and escape the Browne bar by defining the alleged deceptive act as arising from the
advertisements placed on the profile page.  Yet he has alleged no damages flowing from that deceptive
act.  Indeed, it would be contrary to the allegations of the complaint for him to do so, as he alleges that
the prospective client called him in spite of the advertisements of other attorneys on his page, not
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because of them.  
Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that would demonstrate a probability of prevailing
on his WCPA claim.  Nor has he brought forth any evidence to support his false advertising and misuse
of his likeness claims, or argued any elements of these torts under Washington law.  Plaintiff was put on
notice by the Order of Transfer that he is bound by the Terms of Use,  and as an experienced attorney he
should have anticipated that this Court would find him bound by the choice of law provisions therein. 
Yet he chose to oppose the motion to strike solely under Florida law, and failed to come forward with
any evidence to support his claims even under Florida law.  As plaintiff has not produced clear and
convincing evidence to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on any of his claims, the motion to strike
under RCW 4.24.525 shall be granted as to all claims.  
CONCLUSION
Defendant has met the burden under RCW 4.24.525(4)(b) of demonstrating that plaintiff’s
claims are based on an action involving public participation or petition in an issue of public concern. 
The burden therefore shifts to plaintiff to show, by clear and convincing evidence, a probability of
prevailing on his claim.  Plaintiff has failed to produce or point to such evidence.  The special motion to
strike (Dkt. # 47) is accordingly GRANTED as to all claims, and this action is DISMISSED.
Pursuant to RCW 4.24.525(6)(a)(I) and (ii), defendant as the prevailing party is entitled to costs
of litigation and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in connection with each successful motion, together
with a statutory award of ten thousand dollars.  Defendant shall accordingly make application to the
Court for reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in bringing the motion to transfer venue (Dkt. # 32) and
this motion (Dkt. # 47).  Such application shall be filed within three weeks of the date of this Order, and
shall be noted on the Court’s calendar for the third Friday thereafter so plaintiff may have an
opportunity to respond.  
//
//
//
//
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Judgment shall be entered after the Court has determined the amount of reasonable attorney’s
fees and shall include such amount.    
Dated this 28 day of March 2012.
A
RICARDO S. MARTINEZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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